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Drug War Madness:  A Call for Consistency 
Amidst the Conflict 
Kasey C. Phillips* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent weeks, months, and even years, the phrase “war on 
drugs” has typically been accompanied by the term “failure.”  
Walter Cronkite, former anchorman of the CBS evening news, 
noted that it is “plain for all to see: the war on drugs is a 
failure.”1  Similarly, Joy Olson, executive director of the 
Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights 
organization promoting democracy, stated at a drug policy 
conference that she “think[s] U.S. drug policy has failed.”2  
Likewise, Terry Nelson, a member of Law Enforcement Against 
Prohibition, “considers the war on drugs to be the greatest public 
policy failure of all time.”3  New York Times columnist Nicholas 
D. Kristof asserts that, forty years after President Nixon declared 
the war on drugs, “it now appears that drugs have won.”4  Among 
the criticisms and complaints of United States drug policy are 
calls for reform by former international presidents,5 nonprofit 
organizations,6 judges,7 politicians,8 and scholars9 alike. 
* J.D. 2010 Chapman University School of Law; B.S. 2007 Chapman University.  I 
am eternally grateful for the constant love and support of my parents, Barbara and Harry 
Phillips, who taught me to “live the dream” and for the ever-present encouragement from 
my sister, Haylee Phillips.  I would like to extend my undying gratitude to all of the 
panelists and participants in the 2010 Chapman Law Review Symposium, and to the 
members of the 2009-2010 Chapman Law Review Executive Board who made the 
symposium and this issue of the law review a reality.  A special thanks to Errick Winek, 
Hannah Elisha, Jennifer Fry, and Ryan Hurley, without whom this article would never 
have been completed. 
 1 Walter Cronkite, Telling the Truth about the War on Drugs, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-cronkite/telling-the-truth-about-
t_b_16605.html. 
 2 Jesus Martinez, The Failure of the War on Drugs, BORDERZINE, Oct. 8, 2009, 
http://borderzine.com/2009/10/the-failure-of-the-war-on-drugs/. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Nicholas D. Kristof, Drugs Won the War, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at 10, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/opinion/14kristof.html. 
 5 E.g., Tracy Wilkinson, War on Drugs Called a Failure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, 
at A5, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/27/world/fg-mexdrugs27 (reporting 
that former Mexican president, Ernesto Zedillo, demanded “a major rethinking of U.S. 
[drug] policy”). 
 6 E.g., American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/drug-law-reform (calling 
for an “end [to] punitive drug policies”). 
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Part I of this Comment discusses and chronicles the history 
of drug use in the United States and responsive legislation at 
both the state and federal levels.  Part II explains the 
transformation and development of drug policy throughout each 
presidential administration from President Nixon to President 
Obama.  Part III acknowledges and analyzes the inconsistencies 
in drug policy among and within presidential administrations.  
Part IV discusses a few suggested methods in which to reform 
United States drug policy.  Finally, Part V calls for consistency 
through the establishment of a Drug Policy Board that is 
entrusted with the responsibilities of researching, drafting, 
implementing, and enforcing drug policy. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF DRUGS 
Every action elicits a reaction, and drug use is no exception.  
Drug use is not a new concept, but rather an ancient one that 
keeps developing and recreating itself.  In response to each new 
drug, or each new modification of an existing drug, comes 
legislation to regulate and/or prohibit use of that drug. 
A.  Early Drug Use 
From opiates to cocaine and from marijuana to LSD,10 the 
United States has had a constant love-hate relationship with 
drugs. 
i.  Opiates 
Opiate11 use can be traced back to ancient times.  For 
centuries, opiates have been used both medicinally and 
recreationally.12  In 3400 B.C., inhabitants of Mesopotamia 
 7 E.g., Hon. Jim Gray, Judge, Orange County Superior Court, Address at the 
Chapman Law Review Annual Symposium (Jan. 29, 2010). 
 8 E.g., Asa Hutchinson, Former Congressman and Former Dir., U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Admin., Address at the Chapman Law Review Annual Symposium (Jan. 29, 
2010). 
 9 E.g., Alex Kreit, Associate Professor of Law and Dir. of the Ctr. for Law and Social 
Justice, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Address at the Chapman Law Review Annual 
Symposium (Jan. 29, 2010). 
 10 “LSD” is the most well recognized name for lysergic acid diethylamide, which is 
often considered to be the most widely known and the most commonly used hallucinogen 
in the United States.  Drug Abuse Help, Honest Drug Abuse Information: LSD Addiction, 
Abuse and Treatment, http://www.drugabusehelp.com/drugs/lsd/ (last visited June 14, 
2010). 
 11 Opium is an addictive narcotic drug that is obtained from the seeds of an opium 
poppy. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1233 (4th ed. 2000).  Similarly, an opiate is 
a drug (such as morphine or heroin) containing or deriving from opium which tends to 
induce sleep and ease pain. Id. 
 12 Evolution of Opiates in History, http://www.opiates.com/opiates/opiate-
history.html (last visited June 14, 2010). 
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cultivated the first opium poppy and soon thereafter the opium 
trade flourished.  Opium was traded throughout the Mediter-
ranean, Europe, Persia, and India.13 
In the early 1800s, European chemists separated morphine 
from opium to be used as a painkiller.14  Morphine was 
considered a “wonder drug” because it virtually eliminated 
extreme pain and discomfort associated with injuries, surgeries, 
and other medical operations, and doctors used morphine to 
render patients completely numb and put them in a dream-like 
state.15  Morphine made its debut in the United States in the 
1850s and gained ever increasing popularity in the medical field 
because the benefits of using the drug were considered 
extraordinary.16  Regrettably, the enormously addictive prop-
erties of morphine went unrecognized until after the Civil War.17 
In 1895, Germany’s Bayer Company developed another 
opium derivative—heroin—by diluting morphine with acetyls, 
and it brought heroin to the commercial market three years later 
in 1898.18  Early studies indicated that heroin was far more 
effective at treating respiratory illness than codeine, another 
opiate.19  Understandably, just one year after Bayer brought 
heroin to the market it was being exported to twenty-three 
countries.20 
ii.  Cocaine 
The use of the coca plant dates back thousands of years.21  
South American Indians would honor the plant as a goddess.22  
 13 Id. 
 14 ELAINE CASEY, NATIONAL DRUG ABUSE CENTER FOR TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT, 
HISTORY OF DRUG USE AND DRUG USERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1978), 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/casey1.htm. 
 15 A German pharmacist, Dr. F. W. A. Sertürner named the drug morphine after the 
Greek god of dreams Morepheus, because of the extreme euphoric effects. History of 
Heroin, http://www.friendsofnarconon.org/drug_education/index.php?option=content& 
task=view&id=28 (last visited June 14, 2010). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id.  See also CASEY, supra note 14 (stating that physicians believed that when 
injected intravenously, morphine was non-addictive and could cure addictions that were 
caused by processing opium through the stomach lining if ingested). 
 18 Evolution of Opiates in History, http://www.opiates.com/opiates/opiate-
history.html (last visited June 14, 2010).  Heroin was advertised as being ten times more 
potent than morphine as a painkiller, and, because it was thought to be non-addictive, it 
was claimed that using heroin would cure opium and morphine addiction. CASEY, supra 
note 14. 
 19 The Invention of Heroin, http://www.michaelshouse.com/heroin-rehab/history-of-
heroin-addiction.html (last visited June 14, 2010). 
 20 Heroin History, http://www.heroin-addiction.info/history.htm (last visited June 14, 
2010). 
 21 Dani Edmonson, The History of Cocaine, TRANSWORLDNEWS, Feb. 9, 2010, 
http://www.transworldnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?id=180873&cat=15 (last visited 
June 14, 2010). 
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Indians would gnaw on the leaves of the plant with the belief 
that they were achieving spiritual protection and medical 
benefits, among other things.23  Initially, upon arriving in South 
America, the Spanish rejected the coca plant; however, the 
Catholic Church began to cultivate the plant shortly thereafter 
and distributed it multiple times a day to laborers.24  The 
Spanish returned to Europe with their new discovery, which 
shortly became known as “the elixir to life.”25 
In 1860, chemist Albert Niemann finally isolated the active 
ingredient in the coca plant and named it cocaine.26  Cocaine 
quickly became widespread because it could be included in 
cigarettes and alcohol when in powder form.27  In the early 1900s, 
cocaine emerged on the global market and was embraced by the 
world.28  Unfortunately, the negative effects of the drug quickly 
followed its widespread distribution.29 
iii.  Marijuana 
Like opiates and cocaine, marijuana has been used for 
centuries.30  Marijuana spread from China to India and Africa 
before reaching Europe as early as A.D. 500.31  The Spanish 
introduced marijuana to the western hemisphere in 1545, and by 
1622, after the English brought it to Jamestown, it became a 
highly profitable crop.32  Nonetheless, marijuana fell out of favor 
until its reemergence in the 1920s.33  Some attribute marijuana’s 
rise in popularity to Prohibition.34  Marijuana was particularly 
popular in the jazz community, and tea pads—marijuana clubs—
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Edmonson, supra note 21. 
 28 Id.  The Coca-Cola Company even incorporated cocaine into their early formulas.  
It was not until 1903 that Coca Cola actually removed cocaine from its formula. See In 
Search of the Big Bang: What is Crack Cocaine?, http://www.cocaine.org/ (last visited 
June 15, 2010). 
 29 Cocaine was socially linked to prostitutes, gamblers, and other societal outcasts. 
Edmonson, supra note 21. 
 30 History of Marijuana, http://www.narconon.org/drug-information/marijuana-
history.html (last visited June 15, 2010).  Although a Chinese medical digest dated 
marijuana use, with intoxicating characteristics, back to 2737 B.C., the focus was its 
medicinal value. Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 History of Marijuana, supra note 30 (explaining that in the South, cotton had 
replaced marijuana as the major cash crop by the late 1800s and marijuana was included 
in some medicines during this time, but only a tiny percentage compared to those 
medicines containing opium or cocaine). 
 34 Id.  See also CASEY, supra note 14 (listing a number of items that were the targets 
of the early twentieth century prohibitionists, including alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana). 
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appeared in all major cities throughout the United States.35  The 
tea pads were tolerated by the police as marijuana was not illegal 
and tea pad clientele showed no signs of causing disturbances 
within the community.36 
Until 1942, marijuana was included in the United States 
Pharmacopeia37 as a medicine under the title “Extractum 
Cannabis.”38  Marijuana was not only prescribed by physicians 
for labor pain, nausea, and rheumatism, among other ailments, 
but was also commonly used as an intoxicant until the 1930s.39  
It was then that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics started a 
campaign depicting marijuana as an addictive substance that 
could lead to addiction of other narcotics.40  It claimed that 
marijuana was in fact a “gateway” drug.41 
iv.  Hallucinogens 
The history of hallucinogens42 is rooted in religious traditions 
that date back centuries.43  One of the most common 
hallucinogens is lysergic acid diethylamide, more commonly 
known as LSD.44  Two Swiss scientists, Dr. Albert Hofmann and 
W. A. Stoll of Sandoz Laboratories, discovered LSD in 1938.45  
Initial animal testing showed no extraordinary properties, 
resulting in the drug being shelved for the next five years.  Then 
in 1943, Dr. Hofmann accidentally ingested the drug, thereby 
 35 History of Marijuana, supra note 33.  See also CASEY, supra note 14. 
 36 See History of Marijuana, supra note 30.  So-called tea pads were accepted as 
much as speakeasies were accepted.  The tea pads were in fact prevalent as there were 
allegedly 500 of them in New York City alone by the 1930s. CASEY, supra note 14. 
 37 The United States Pharmacopeia “is a non-governmental, official public 
standards-setting authority for prescription and over-the-counter medicines and other 
healthcare products manufactured or sold in the United States.”  The United States 
Pharmacopeia sets quality, purity, strength, and consistency standards for drugs as well 
as food ingredients and dietary supplements.  The standards are utilized around the 
world in over one hundred thirty countries and have worked to ensure global public 
health for nearly two hundred years. See about USP, http://www.usp.org/aboutUSP/ (last 
visited June 21, 2010). 
 38 CASEY, supra note 14.  The tea pads “resembled opium dens or speakeasies except 
that prices were very low; a man could get high for a quarter on marihuana smoked in the 
pad, or for even less if he bought the marihuana at the door and took it away to smoke.”  
Id. 
 39 History of Marijuana, supra note 30. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Hallucinogens are drugs that cause hallucinations.  They are partially composed 
of nitrogen and classified as alkaloids. See NIDA InfoFacts: Hallucinogens—LSD, Peyote, 
Psilocybin, and PCP, http://www.drugabuse.gov/Infofacts/hallucinogens.html (last visited 
June 21, 2010). 
 43 Id. 
 44 LSD has a variety of street names including “Acid, Cid, Trips, L, Doses, Vitamin L 
[and] Paper.” See supra note 10. 
 45 CASEY, supra note 14. 
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unlocking the secret of its subsequent popularity.46  After 
experiencing his first acid trip, Dr. Hofmann returned to the lab 
the following week and ingested another small amount in order 
to record the effects.47  After his second acid trip, Dr. Hofmann 
sent the drug to the University of Lurich for W. A. Stoll to test.48  
Stoll found that the drug was non-toxic and non-addictive, but 
that an exceptionally small dose rendered intense results.49  LSD 
supposedly first appeared in the United States in 1963, but the 
media did not acknowledge its widespread use until 1966.50 
B.  Early Legislation  
Not surprisingly, both State and Federal authorities reacted 
to the introduction of the various above-mentioned drugs.  As the 
use of any particular drug became widespread, legislation quickly 
followed. 
i.  State Legislation 
In 1872, California led the way in opium prohibition by 
passing the first anti-opium law.51  The law stated that “the 
administration of laudunum, an opium preparation, or any other 
narcotic to any person with the intent thereby to facilitate the 
commission of a felony” now amounted to a felony.52  
Unfortunately this law failed to control unlawful use of opium in 
the State.53  In 1881, California tried again, enacting a law 
“making it a misdemeanor to maintain a place where opium was 
sold, given away, or smoked.”54  However, the bill applied 
exclusively to commercial locations; smoking opium in a private 
residence was not covered, thus the practice continued.55  
 46 Id. 
 47 Dr. Hofmann recorded his experience, noting that he felt dizziness, was unable to 
focus, and could not control his laughter; the drug distorted his vision and his hearing and 
caused him to shout and babble intermittently. Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 LSD is so potent it had to be measured in micrograms (millionths of a gram) as 
compared with other drugs that are measure in milligrams (thousandths of a gram); an 
amount the size of an aspirin tablet could generate effects in approximately three 
thousand people. Id. 
 50 Drug Abuse Help: LSD, http://www.drugabusehelp.com/drugs/lsd/ (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2010). 
 51 CASEY, supra note 14. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 In 1881, California established a separate agency dedicated to narcotics 
enforcement; it was the first state to do so.  California was also among the first states that 
provided treatment for addicts. CASEY, supra note 14. 
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Following California’s lead, more western states began to pass 
legislation restricting the use of opium.56 
Early laws tended to limit or ban possession of opium 
derivatives without consideration as to whether the substances 
had any medicinal value.  Laws focused on the manner in which 
drugs changed hands, rather than determining what qualified as 
legitimate medicinal use.  With their limited knowledge, doctors 
continued to recommend opium derivatives to cure an assortment 
of ailments despite the obvious problems with addiction.57 
In the 1920s, states also started passing laws in an attempt 
to temper marijuana use.  Louisiana lead the charge, passing a 
law in 1927 that required a $500 fine or six months in prison for 
the sale or possession of marijuana.58  Despite frequent arrests 
and a decline in imports, marijuana use continued.59  Two years 
later, Colorado passed legislation also targeted at prohibiting 
marijuana.60  By 1937, forty-six states and the District of 
Columbia had enacted laws against marijuana use.61 
Hallucinogens, including LSD, were also the subject of 
prohibitive legislation.  In 1965, the state of New York enacted 
legislation that prohibited “possessing, selling, giving away, or 
 56 In 1877, Nevada became the first state to actually prohibit opium smoking; the 
law stated that it was illegal to sell opium without a prescription and it forbade the 
continuation of any place used for smoking opium.  Also in 1887, the Territory of Oregon 
passed the first comprehensive anti-substance law, requiring physicians and pharmacists 
to have licenses and prohibiting the sale, gift, or possession of “opium, ‘smoking opium,’ 
morphine, cocaine, or chloral hydrate, except by prescription of a licensed physician.”  
Other states enacted similar legislation, but uniformity was lacking and the legislative 
schemes did not agree on which drugs to control, which controls to enforce, and what type 
of penalties to impose upon violators. Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 CASEY, supra note 14. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Colorado’s 1929 anti-marijuana laws were probably passed to curb the habits of 
Mexican laborers who brought marijuana with them when they journeyed to Colorado to 
work in the sugar beet fields. Id. 
 61 State legislation against marijuana only increased after the federal government 
passed the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. EDWARD M. BRECHER, ET AL., LICIT AND ILLICIT 
DRUGS 413, 419–20 (Little, Brown & Co. 1972).  Most states thought that marijuana 
penalties should mirror heroin penalties; because of this, marijuana penalties increased 
overnight in comparison to the heroin penalties that had taken decades to intensify. Id.  
State penalties were severe and, as recently as 1970, the following laws were enforced.  In 
Georgia, the first-time sale of marijuana to a minor sent the seller to prison for life; a 
second offense gave him the death penalty. Id.  In Illinois, a first time offense of selling 
marijuana was punishable by ten years to life in prison; a second offense required a life 
sentence. Id.  In Louisiana, possession of marijuana called for five years of hard labor; 
selling marijuana to an adult was a minimum of ten years hard labor, while selling it to 
someone under twenty-one could result in a maximum penalty of death, even with just 
the first offense. Id.  In Massachusetts, a person was sentenced to up to five years in 
prison for being in a place where marijuana was stored or for accompanying anyone 
known to possess marijuana. Id.  In Missouri, a first-sale offense could result in a life 
sentence; if the sale was to a minor, the sentence was death. Id. 
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otherwise distributing LSD,” and imposed a maximum two year 
prison sentence for those convicted.62  California followed New 
York’s lead when it passed the Grunsky bill in 1966, which 
forbade the “possession, sale, manufacture, or importation” of 
LSD.63 
ii.  Federal Legislation 
State legislatures were not the only ones to get involved in 
the prohibition of drugs; the federal government enacted its fair 
share of drug related legislation aimed at prohibition. 
The U.S. Congress banned opium in 1905.64  Then, in 1906, 
Congress enacted the first Pure Food and Drug Act, which 
required that medicines containing opiates have a label 
indicating opium contents.65  The Pure Food and Drug Act, the 
efforts leading up to it, and the later amendments to the Act 
helped to temper an increase in new addicts; there was even a 
slight decrease in opiate addition from the end of the nineteenth 
century until 1914.66  However, this was not enough. 
In 1914, the U.S. government passed the Harrison Narcotic 
Act with the ultimate purpose of eliminating the illegal supply of 
opiates.67  The Act required manufacturers, importers, pharma-
cists, and physicians prescribing narcotics to become licensed to 
do so and implemented a small tax.68  At first glance, the 
Harrison Narcotic Act did not appear to be a prohibition law; it 
just seemed to be a regulation to ensure a systematic marketing 
of opiates—in tiny amounts over-the-counter and in larger 
amounts by prescription.  In fact, physicians had an express right 
to prescribe opiate medications: “Nothing contained in this 
section shall apply . . . [t]o the dispensing or distribution of any of 
the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or 
 62 In 1966, New York increased the maximum term of imprisonment to twenty years 
in response to the panic felt by its citizens. CASEY, supra note 14. 
 63 The new legislation and its publicity resulted in increased popularity and 
increased prices for LSD. Id. 
 64 Opium Throughout History, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
heroin/etc/history.html (last visited June 20, 2010). 
 65 Congress later amended the Act, requiring that the quantity of the opiate content 
be designated on the label and that the drug meet national identity and purity 
regulations.  BRECHER, supra note 61, at 47. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 223, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786–87 
(1915) (purporting to prohibit “any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of 
the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order . . . on a form to be 
issued . . . by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue”). 
 68 The act exempted patient-medicine manufacturers only if they limited themselves 
to “preparations and remedies which do not contain more than two grains of opium, or 
more than one-fourth of a grain of morphine, or more than one-eighth of a grain of 
heroin . . . in one avoirdupois ounce.” Id. 
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veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the course of his 
professional practice only . . . .”69  Thus, it is likely that no 
legislator in 1914 recognized that the Act would be considered 
prohibition legislation in the future. 
It was the last phrase in the Act that became controversial.  
Authorities interpreted the phrase “in the course of his 
professional practice only” to mean that opiates could not be 
prescribed for addicts to feed their addiction because addiction is 
not a disease and thus, an addict is not a patient for which 
physicians could prescribe medicine “in the course of [their] 
professional practice . . . .”70  With this interpretation, a law once 
designed to ensure orderly marketing of opiates was transformed 
into legislation prohibiting the furnishing of opiates to addicts, 
even by prescription.71 
The Harrison Act had other unforeseen consequences—
namely, the development of a raging black market.  Just six 
months after the passage of the Harrison Act, an editorial in 
American Medicine acknowledged the gravity of drug addiction.72  
The article accused the Harrison Act of failing to do what it was 
designed to do—in fact, it made things worse, not better.73  
Doctors were unable to provide medical attention to those who 
needed it most, addicts.  Open and legitimate means of obtaining 
drugs were eliminated and addicts were “driven to the 
underworld” where they were forced to obtained drugs through 
illegal channels.74  The article went on to describe the black 
market that was exacerbated by the Harrison Act, portraying 
people who were under the influence as the “worst elements of 
society.”75 
Just three years after Congress passed the Harrison Act, the 
Secretary of the Treasury created a committee76 to review the 
problems created by the act.77  The committee eventually called 
for stricter law enforcement and more state laws designed after 
 69 Id. 
 70 BRECHER, supra note 61. 
 71 Numerous physicians fell prey to this interpretation; they were arrested, 
convicted, and imprisoned.  Those who were not imprisoned still faced ruinous publicity 
that virtually decimated their careers. Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 BRECHER, supra note 61. 
 76 Committee members included: Congressman Homer T. Rainey (Chairman), a 
professor of pharmacology at Harvard, a former deputy commissioner of internal revenue 
responsible for law enforcement, and Dr. A. G. Du Mez, Secretary of the United States 
Public Health Service. Id. 
 77 Id. 
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the Harrison Act, and Congress responded.78  However, despite 
Congress’ attempts to rectify the problems, the Harrison Act 
faced continual and constant criticism.79 
In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was 
established80 and assumed control over the enforcement of 
federal anti-opiate and anti-cocaine laws.81  FBN Commissioner 
Harry J. Anslinger lobbied to have marijuana included in future 
federal laws.82  After much urging, Congress finally enacted the 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.83  While the Marihuana Tax Act did 
not actually prohibit marijuana, it imposed a tax on 
distributors.84  However, the Act also recognized the medical 
significance of marijuana.85  During that same time period, 
Congress passed a program imposing higher penalties for 
subsequent violations of drug laws.86 
Over the course of the next few decades, Congress continued 
to pass drug laws.  In 1939, the federal government enacted a 
law allowing authorities to impound any vehicle used to 
 78 Congress tightened the Harrison Act by, among other things, completely 
prohibiting heroin imports.  The prohibition derived from the growing societal belief that 
heroin was significantly more harmful than morphine or opium.  In 1925, Dr. Lawrence 
Kolb stated that any difference between the effects of morphine and heroin would be too 
miniscule to verify.  Similarly, in 1967, President Johnson's Committee on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded that heroin and morphine did not 
differ in effect, although heroin was faster-acting. Id. 
 79 In 1936, Berkley, California’s former chief of police, August Vollmer, asserted that 
strict laws were not only “useless and enormously expensive,” but were also “unjustifiably 
and unbelievably cruel in their application . . . .”  Vollmer argued that drug addiction was 
not a police problem, but rather a medical one. AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND 
MODERN SOCIETY 117–18 (McGrath Publishing Co. 1969).  Then, in 1940, recognized critic 
of drug laws Professor Alfred Lindesmith compared imprisoning an addict to imprisoning 
a patient for contracting a disease; he stated that both would be cruel and unusual 
punishment. A. R. Lindesmith, “Dope Fiend” Mythology, 31 J. AM. INST. OF CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 199, 207–208 (July–Aug. 1940).  In 1953, the chairman of the American Bar 
Association, Rufus King, Esq., wrote that an addict was a slave to his habit and would 
commit crimes to feed his addictions; King went on to state that the billions of dollars 
spent on enforcement had done nothing but increase profits in the black market. Rufus G. 
King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62 
YALE L. J. 736, 749 (1953). 
 80 Marijuana Timeline—Important Dates in History of Marijuana, 
http://marijuanatoday.com/timeline.php (last visited June 23, 2010). 
 81 CASEY, supra note 14. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 People in the medical field paid an annual licensing fee of one dollar, enabling 
them to prescribe marijuana to patients.  Pharmacists had to pay a fifteen dollar licensing 
fee to dispense marijuana.  Growers had to pay an annual tax of twenty-five dollars to 
continue cultivating the drug.  Importers and manufacturers paid fifty dollars a year to 
continue their businesses.  All other untaxed sale or possession of marijuana was made 
illegal. Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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transport illegal drugs.87  In 1942, opium growers were forced to 
obtain a license under a federal opium poppy control act.88  In 
1946, Congress passed legislation controlling synthetic drugs.89  
In 1951, the Boggs Act set forth mandatory minimum prison 
sentences of two to five years for first time drug offenders.90 
In 1956, President Eisenhower signed the Narcotic Control 
Act, which increased penalties for drug law violations originally 
set forth by the Boggs Act.91  It extinguished virtually all 
discretion to suspend or reduce the sentences of anyone convicted 
of violating any other federal criminal law.92  The Act authorized 
narcotics agents and customs officers to carry guns, serve 
warrants, and arrest violators without a warrant.93  All convicted 
drug offenders, addicts, and users were required to register for 
and acquire a special certificate to leave the United States.  They 
were required to return the certificate upon re-entering the 
United States.94  Failure to comply with this requirement 
resulted in imprisonment ranging from one to three years and a 
fine.95  In addition, the Act impacted immigration laws.  Narcotic 
offenses were now grounds for exclusion or deportation, and 
courts were prohibited from discouraging deportation in 
proceedings involving convicted drug offenders.96 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the stringent laws in place 
prohibiting opiates, marijuana, and synthetic drugs, Americans 
began to adopt new substances to take the place of those that had 
become illegal.  This immediately caused Congress to react by 
passing the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965.97  Unlike 
the Harrison Act, which relied on the taxing power, the Drug 
Abuse Control Amendments relied on Congress’ interstate 
commerce power.98  The legislation covered all known 
 87 Id. at 17. 
 88 CASEY, supra note 14. 
 89 Id. at 18. 
 90 Jordan Smith, Reefer Madness: Drug Laws Are So Fifties, AUSTIN CHRON., Oct. 17, 
2008, at 30, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/download/2008-10-17/ 
chronicle.pdf. 
 91 The Act required a sentence of five to twenty years for first time convictions of 
drug smuggling or selling, and a sentence of ten to forty years for subsequent violations; 
there was a required sentence of ten to forty years for sale by an adult to a minor, and a 
sentence of ten years to life, or even death, if the adult sold heroin to the minor. RUFUS 
KING, THE DRUG HANG UP, AMERICA'S FIFTY-YEAR FOLLY 147 (Charles C. Thomas 1974) 
(1972).  See also Smith, supra note 90. 
 92 KING, supra note 91. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 147–48. 
 96 Id. 
 97 KING, supra note 91, at 279. 
 98 Id. 
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depressants and stimulants, and all other substances that could 
potentially be abused because of their depressant, stimulant, or 
hallucinogenic effects.99  The registration, inspection, and record-
keeping requirements of the Amendments practically mirrored 
those of the Harrison Act.100  While lighter punishments for 
opiate, cocaine, and marijuana offenses were imposed with no 
mandatory minimum penalties, mere possession without proper 
compliance was a federal crime.101  However, what made the 
Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 different from past 
legislation was the inclusion of a “counterfeit drugs provision.”102 
In 1966, Congress passed the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation 
Act, which, rather than focusing on enforcement of drug laws, 
centered on treatment.103  The Act consisted of four main 
sections: Section One enabled addict offenders to choose 
treatment over prosecution; Section Two allowed for treatment 
following conviction; Section Three provided that in the absence 
of a federal crime an addict could petition the United States 
Attorney in his or her district for treatment; and Section Four 
granted state funding for treating drug addiction.104  In 1968, 
President Johnson created the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) under the Department of Justice by 
combining the Federal Bureau of Narcotics with the Bureau of 
Drug Abuse Control.105  This new bureau enforced federal laws 
relating to the suppression of illegal drugs.106 
Despite the aggressive legislation enacted by Congress, 
America’s love affair with drugs continued and progressed into “a 
serious national threat.”107 
C.  Declaration of the “War On Drugs” 
On July 14, 1969, President Richard Nixon drafted a special 
message to Congress to address America’s drug problem.108  
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 279–80. 
 101 Id. at 280. 
 102 KING, supra note 91, at 280. 
 103 Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438 
(1967). 
 104 Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, supra note 103. 
 105 Dep’t of Justice, Supplemental Financial and Management Information: DEA 
History, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a9731a/a9731ap5.htm (last visited 
June 20, 2010). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Richard Nixon Foundation, Special Message to Congress on Control of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs, July 14, 1969, http://www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/ 
clientuploads/directory/archive/1969_pdf_files/1969_0266.pdf [hereinafter Richard Nixon 
Foundation, Special Message] 
 108 Id. 
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President Nixon urged that a national drug policy was necessary 
and asserted that it needed to start at the federal level.109  The 
message stated that Congress would receive a “comprehensive 
legislative proposal to control . . . drugs,” and encouraged 
Congress to “take favorable action.”110  President Nixon also 
addressed state involvement in drug control; states were to be 
provided with a model law designed to improve their drug laws 
and “complement the comprehensive drug legislation being 
proposed to Congress at the national level.”111  President Nixon 
hoped that “[t]ogether these proposals [would] provide an 
interlocking trellis of laws which [would] enable government at 
all levels to more effectively control the [drug] problem.”112  
Furthermore, the letter called for international cooperation, 
suppression of illegal importation, suppression of national 
trafficking, education, research, rehabilitation for addicts and 
convicts, training programs for law enforcement officers, and 
local law enforcement conferences.113 
In 1970, in response to President Nixon’s message, Congress 
replaced over fifty pieces of drug legislation with the Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act; Title II of which is widely known as 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).114  The CSA created five 
schedules which categorized controlled substances and provided 
various penalties for violations; drugs were classified according 
to dangerousness, potential for abuse, and medicinal value.115  
Schedule I drugs included heroin, marijuana, LSD, THC, and 
general hallucinogens.116  Schedule II drugs consisted of opium, 
morphine Dilaudide, Demerol, Methadone, cocaine, and liquid 
amphetamine.117  Amphetamines, short-acting barbiturates, 
DoridenR, Noludalo, and RitalenP were listed as Schedule III 
drugs, while mild tranquilizers and long-acting barbiturates 
filled Schedule IV.118  The final category, Schedule V, contained 
mostly over-the-counter substances.119  To supplement the Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, the National Conference of 
Commissioners approved the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Richard Nixon Foundation, Special Message, supra note 107. 
 114 Supplemental Financial and Management Information: DEA History, 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a9731a/a9731ap5.htm (last visited May 13, 2010). 
 115 Id. 
 116 CASEY, supra note 14. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
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which called for state scheduling of federally controlled drugs but 
left it up to each state to prescribe their own penalties.120 
At a press conference in June 1971, President Nixon stated 
that “America’s Public Enemy No. 1 is drug abuse,” and he 
officially heralded the beginning of the War on Drugs.121  The 
President called for the establishment of a Special Action Office 
of Drug Abuse Prevention that would be charged with 
coordinating the activities of the nine federal organizations 
already engaged in drug control efforts.122  This new office would 
construct and launch a federal strategy for drug programs, and 
the office would be responsible for “federal drug-abuse 
prevention, education, treatment, rehabilitation, training, and 
research programs.”123  President Nixon also executed an 
Executive Order temporarily establishing the office and named 
Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe as Director. 124 
The newly announced drug program was slated to cost 
$371 million.125  The largest portion of the budget was designated 
for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug-addicted Vietnam 
veterans.126  The program also called for $2 million to be devoted 
to research and development in detecting illegal drug traffic, 
$2 million for research and development of herbicides which 
would be used to destroy narcotics-producing plants and 
$26.6 million to intensify customs regulations.127  President 
Nixon requested that $10 million be allocated to drug education 
and training.128  President Nixon, the drafters of the drug 
program, and drug prohibitionists were hopeful that the new 
policies would defeat the new Public Enemy No. 1. 
 120 Id. 
 121 The Nation: The New Public Enemy No. 1, TIME, June 28, 1971, at 20, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905238-1,00.html. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id.  Jaffe was the Director of the Drug Abuse Program for the Illinois Department 
of Mental Health as well as a “leading expert on methadone therapy for heroin addicts 
and a major figure in research on drug abuse.” Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id.  President Nixon suggested and implemented a program requiring all soldiers 
to submit to urine tests to determine if they had drugs in their system.  Those determined 
to be using drugs would be subjected to a week of detoxification before returning to the 
United States, and a possible three weeks of additional therapy at Veterans 
Administration (VA) facilities upon their return.  The program was intended to provide 
treatment and rehabilitation at VA facilities to all former servicemen, including those 
who had been dishonorably discharged and were not previously eligible for VA services. 
Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 President Nixon stated “[i]t is essential that the American people are alerted to 
this danger, to recognize that it is not a danger that will pass with the end of the war in 
Viet Nam, because the problem existed before we were in Viet Nam.” Id. 
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II.  PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS AND THEIR DRUG POLICIES 
Every Presidential Administration sets new drug policies, 
appoints new officials in drug-related agencies, and creates new 
drug control budgets.  Some administrations elect to build upon 
their predecessors, while others choose to start new programs. 
A.  Nixon Navigated the War on Drugs 
Throughout his administration, President Nixon stayed true 
to his anti-drug policies.  In 1972, the National Commission on 
Marijuana and Drug Abuse, the American Medical Association, 
and the National Institute of Mental Health concluded and 
advised that possession and distribution of marijuana should be 
decriminalized because “experimental or intermittent use of this 
drug carries minimal risk to the public health, and should not be 
given overzealous attention in terms of a public health 
response.”129  The American Bar Association suggested decreased 
penalties for marijuana possession.130  President Nixon rejected 
these reports and declared an “all-out global war on the drug 
menace.”131 
President Nixon and Congress agreed to consolidate all 
federal drug control agencies under the command of the 
Department of Justice, and thus formed the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) on July 1, 1973.132  On October 4, 1973, John R. 
Bartels, Jr. was confirmed as the DEA’s first administrator; his 
goals were “(1) to integrate narcotics agents and U.S. Customs 
agents into one effective force; and (2) to restore public confidence 
in narcotics law enforcement.”133  Within the same year, Dr. 
Jaffe, head of the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention, 
was succeeded by Dr. Robert DuPont. 
President Nixon was steadfast in his beliefs about marijuana 
and once told Dr. DuPont “[y]ou’re the drug expert, not me, on 
every issue but one, and that’s decriminalization of marijuana.  If 
 129  Ricardo Cortes, Sketches of the Drug Czars, VANITY FAIR, July 29, 2009, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/07/drug-czars-slideshow200907?printable 
=true&slide=6. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973: 
Establishing the Drug Enforcement Administration, 1 PUB. PAPERS 228 (Mar. 28, 1973), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4159. 
 132 President Nixon abolished the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the 
Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, and the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence 
by executive order, thereby placing their combined responsibilities in the newly-formed 
DEA. DEA: A TRADITION OF EXCELLENCE, 1973–2003 13, http://www.justice.gov/dea/ 
pubs/history/1970-1975.pdf. 
 133 Id. at 14. 
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you make any hint of supporting [it], you are history.”134  
However, President Nixon’s presidential term did not last much 
past the appointment of Dr. Dupont.  On August 10, 1974, 
President Nixon formally resigned from the office of President, 
thus ushering in President Gerald Ford and the first of a long 
line of drug policy contradictions. 
B.  Ford Frustrated the Crusade Against Drugs 
In 1974, Gerald Ford became the first Vice President to rise 
to the Presidency by virtue of the current President resigning 
from office.  Robert DuPont stayed on as head of the Special 
Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention but revealed his support 
for decriminalizing marijuana.135  President Ford largely backed 
away from Former President Nixon’s drug policy and essentially 
dissolved DuPont’s office.136  President Ford ordered the White 
House Domestic Council to “undertake a comprehensive review 
and assessment of the overall Federal drug abuse prevention, 
treatment and enforcement effort to ensure that [drug] programs, 
policies and laws are appropriate and effective.”137  In March of 
1976, Congress amended the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment 
Act of 1972 to establish the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) 
in an attempt to vest the responsibility for the federal drug 
program as a whole in a single person within the Executive 
Office of the President.138 
In May 1976, President Ford announced two new cabinet 
committees devoted to the drug program: the Cabinet Committee 
on Drug Law Enforcement139 and the Cabinet Committee on 
Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation.140  On 
July 1, 1976, President Ford presented a special message to 
Congress requesting that they rescind funding for the Office of 
Drug Abuse Policy because the office “adds to the bureaucracy a 
redundant layer that will have no direct management 
responsibilities,” and because “[t]he drug abuse area . . . already 
has the necessary coordinating mechanisms and resources to 
 134 Cortes, supra note 130. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Special Message to the Congress on Crime, 1 PUB. PAPERS 850 (June 19, 1975), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5007. 
 138 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: AN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 14 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-606.pdf. 
 139 Memorandum on the Cabinet Committee for Drug Law Enforcement, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1549 (May 13, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5982. 
 140 Memorandum on the Cabinet Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, 
and Rehabilitation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 465 (May 13, 1976), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5983. 
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accomplish its objectives.”141  Overall, President Ford’s admin-
istration presented a milder tone to drug policy reform. 
C.  Carter Clamored for Drug Policy Reform 
In 1977, Jimmy Carter assumed office as President, and 
drug policy took a major turn.142  President Carter’s drug 
platform was one of decriminalization.143  In a message to 
Congress, President Carter made amendments to the 
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977 by transferring the “functions 
of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy and its Director . . . to the 
President, who may delegate such functions within the Executive 
Office of the President as the President may from time to time 
deem desirable.”144  President Carter appointed Dr. Peter Bourne 
to assume these functions.145  Dr. Bourne asserted that mari-
juana was not a health issue and the White House encouraged 
the National Cancer Institute to increase the availability of 
marijuana.146  In October 1977, “the Senate Judiciary Committee 
voted to decriminalize possession of up to an ounce of marijuana 
for personal use.”147 
However, in July 1978, the Carter administration’s drug 
policy reform came to a screeching halt after a scandal arose from 
a party that had been hosted by the National Organization for 
the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) in December of the 
previous year.148  The Washington Post reported that Dr. Bourne 
had used cocaine and marijuana at that party.149  Bourne 
immediately resigned his position and was replaced by Lee 
Dogoloff, who wanted absolutely nothing to do with NORML, and 
instead was more responsive to Families in Action, an anti-
marijuana organization primarily made up of concerned 
parents.150  Dogoloff insisted that all drugs were bad and that 
penalties for so-called “soft” drugs, like marijuana, should be the 
same as for “hard” drugs like cocaine and heroin, because there 
 141 Special Message to the Congress on a Proposed Appropriations Rescission for the 
Office of Drug Abuse Policy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 633 (July 1, 1976), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6170. 
 142 Cortes, supra note 130. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Executive Office of the President Message to the Congress Transmitting 
Amendments to Reorganization Plan No. I of 1977, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1592 (Sept. 15, 1977), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6634. 
 145 Cortes, supra note 130. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 PATRICK ANDERSON, HIGH IN AMERICA: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND NORML AND 
THE POLITICS OF MARIJUANA 304 (1981), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/special/ 
anderson/highinamerica19.htm. 
Do Not Delete 8/31/2010 9:45 PM 
662 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:645
was essentially no difference.151  In 1979, in a complete change of 
direction from President Carter’s campaign and original drug 
policy actions, the DEA created a model anti-paraphernalia law 
for state legislatures.152  What started out as a dynamic shift in 
drug policy eventually dissipated, and soon all remnants of 
decriminalization were completely stamped out by a new 
presidential administration. 
D.  Reagan Revitalized the War on Drugs and “Just Said No”153 
Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980, and when he 
assumed office in January 1981, he ushered in the era of “zero 
tolerance.”154  In 1982, President Reagan criticized the drug 
policy of former President Carter by stating that he was “taking 
down the surrender flag . . . [and] running up the battle flag.”155  
President Reagan shifted the focus of drug policy away from 
treatment and toward enforcement.  He believed that the 
government had no place in interfering with the lives of addicts, 
and thus treatment centers were shutdown.156  Money was 
diverted from treatment to attacking the drug problem at its 
source through the prohibition of drug cultivation, smuggling, 
and trafficking.157  U.S. District Attorneys were ordered to 
“abandon their long-established emphasis on white-collar crime 
and focus instead primarily on drug violations.”158  In President 
Reagan’s drug policy, numbers were the key to showing the 
American public that the Reagan Administration was active in 
the war on drugs.159  Associate Attorney General Rudy Giuliani 
commented that Reagan’s efforts were the “most intense federal 
effort ever against drugs.”160 
 151 Walter Wink, Drug Policy: The Fix We're In, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 24, 1999, 
at 214, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_6_116/ai_54062897/ 
?tag=content;col1. 
 152 The constitutionality of the model law was questionable, but its impact was 
clear—the anti-marijuana proponents had the go-ahead from the Carter administration. 
ANDERSON, supra note 150.  See also Law: Potshots at “Head Shops,” TIME, Apr. 21, 1980, 
at 78, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,924029,00.html. 
 153  On July 4, 1984, at an elementary school in California, a student asked the First 
Lady what he should do if he was offered drugs; the First Lady simply responded “just say 
no.” RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S: PERCEPTIONS, POLICIES, LEGACIES 49 (Cheryl 
Hudson & Gareth Davies eds., Palgrave McMillan 2008) [hereinafter RONALD REAGAN 
AND THE 1980S]. 
 154 Cortes, supra note 130. 
 155 RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S, supra note 153. 
 156 Wink, supra note 151. 
 157 Id. 
 158 RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S, supra note 155, at 48. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Cortes, supra note 130. 
Do Not Delete 8/31/2010 9:45 PM 
2010] Drug War Madness 663 
President Reagan put Carlton Turner in charge of drug 
policy and encouraged every Cabinet member to establish a drug 
program within his or her department.161  Even First Lady Nancy 
Reagan invested herself in tackling drug problems.  Nancy 
Reagan coined what became the motto for anti-drug activists—
”Just Say No.”162  Also during this time, Senator Joe Biden (now 
Vice President Biden) advocated for a “drug czar”—a Cabinet-
level position to coordinate federal drug agencies.163 
While President Reagan was strict and steadfast in his anti-
drug policy, the situation did not appear to be improving.  The 
National Institute on Drug Abuse compiled monthly figures on 
drug-related deaths.164  Under former President Carter, the 
number of deaths steadily declined, but within just months of 
President Reagan taking office, drug-related deaths were on the 
rise.165  Eventually, the Reagan administration ordered the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse to stop releasing their findings, 
claiming they were “no longer relevant to the War on Drugs.”166 
Additionally, while the Reagan administration primarily 
focused on marijuana use, it was forced to confront cocaine head 
on—a situation that Carlton Turner, as a non-physician, was 
unable to handle.167  Turner resigned his position after isolating 
himself by refusing to speak with any treatment professionals 
regarding the quickly developing crack cocaine problem.168  Dr. 
Ian MacDonald replaced Turner, but was also not equipped to 
deal with America’s drug problems.169  Instead, it was Attorney 
General Ed Meese who continued to lead the charge, remaining 
focused on military and law enforcement approaches and 
refusing to even entertain treatment ideas raised by Dr. 
MacDonald.170  Democratic Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill 
threw his hat into the drug policy ring, urging Democrats to be as 
tough on drugs as their Republican counterparts.171  From June 
1986 until October of that same year, twenty-six new mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug crimes were passed.172  By the end 
 161 RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S, supra note 155, at 50–51. 
 162 See RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S, supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 163 Cortes, supra note 130. 
 164 RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S, supra note 155, at 51. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 52. 
 168 Id. 
 169 RONALD REAGAN AND THE 1980S, supra note 155, at 52. 
 170 Id. at 53. 
 171 Id. at 54. 
 172 Id. 
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of the Reagan administration, America was practically in a state 
of hysteria over the progressing drug problem.173 
E.  Bush Believed Enforcement Was Key 
After George H. W. Bush took presidential office, he signed 
into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.174  The Act set out to 
fight illegal drug use primarily through the creation of the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).175  President Bush 
appointed William Bennett to lead the ONDCP, in a position 
more commonly known as “drug czar.”176  Bennett took an 
extreme stance on drug use, claiming that addicts were not sick, 
but rather that they were immoral.177  Bennett believed that 
offenders were responsible for themselves and that if they were 
not going to stop using drugs and harming society, then they did 
not deserve treatment.178  His message was clear: being bad 
resulted in the fullest penalties of the law, not help in the form of 
treatment or rehabilitation.179 
In September of 1989, President George H. W. Bush 
presented the federal government’s plan for eliminating drug 
use.180  The program called for a budget of almost $8 billion, with 
seventy percent going to law enforcement and thirty percent 
going to prevention, education, and treatment.181  The budget 
drew great criticism.  Researchers balked when Bush proposed 
only $500 million to be spent on research; some thought that not 
enough information about addiction was available to create an 
effective program, while others claimed that the future of drug 
treatment was actually in the discovery of new drugs.182  
President Bush’s program was relentlessly criticized for the 
absence of a focus on treatment.  Even Congress felt the plan was 
too light in treatment, funding so it added $1.1 billion to the 
original $925 million set aside for treatment.183  Lack of 
treatment facilities presented another problem.  Public facilities 
were overflowing, and individuals wishing to enter treatment 
programs had to be placed on long waitlists.184 
 173 Id. 
 174 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Wink, supra note 151, at 215. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Dan Check, The Successes and Failures of George Bush's War on Drugs, 
http://www.drugsense.org/tfy/bushwar.htm (last visited June 22, 2010). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
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The Bush administration proposed targeting the demand for 
drugs by arresting users instead of investing in prevention or 
attacking supply channels.185  The plan was to be implemented 
not by federal forces, but through state law enforcement, with 
penalties in the form of reduced funding for States that failed to 
comply.186  Drug arrests increased by almost sixty-nine percent, 
from 56,013 in 1985 to 94,490 in 1989, resulting in a 
skyrocketing prison population.187  This prison overcrowding 
meant that prison sentences had to be reduced.  With reduced 
prison sentences, offenders often chose to serve their prison 
terms instead of going into treatment, which could take longer.188 
The biggest success of the Bush Administration was the 
twenty-two percent decline in cocaine usage.189  However, it is 
unclear whether the government was entirely responsible for this 
decline; it is also a possibility that the middle class began 
voluntarily backing away from cocaine after learning of its 
effects.190  In contrast to the overall decline in cocaine use, 
cocaine use among the poor soared to levels higher than before 
the war on drugs was declared, and the crime rate increased as 
well.191  In general, President George H. W. Bush continued 
former President Reagan’s crusade against drugs, primarily 
focusing on law enforcement efforts.  However, at the end of 
President Bush’s term, America saw little if any progress in the 
War on Drugs. 
F.  Clinton Contended for Increased Treatment in Drug Policy 
Throughout his presidential campaign, President Bill 
Clinton criticized former President George H. W. Bush’s 
performance in regard to the drug war, stating: 
Bush confuses being tough with being smart, especially on drugs.  You 
can’t get serious about crime without getting serious about drugs.  
Bush thinks locking up addicts instead of treating them before they 
commit crimes—or failing to treat them once they’re in prison, which 
is basically the case now—is clever politics.  That may be, but it 
 185 Check, supra note 180. 
 186 In November of 1990, Congress passed a bill encouraging states to suspend 
driver's licenses and revoke government permits and benefits of drug crime convicts; if the 
states did not enact the legislation, the federal government would significantly reduce the 
federal funding for highways.  Under the plan, states were slated to receive only 
$200 million from the federal government to pay for the extra expense of implementing 
the federal program. Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Check, supra note 180. 
 191 Id. 
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certainly isn’t sound policy, and the consequences of his cravenness 
could ruin us.192 
President Clinton also called for drug policy reform that 
favored treatment over enforcement.  He asserted: 
Without it, the criminals will revert when they’re released, and the 
problem will just get worse.  Emphasizing treatment may not satisfy 
people fed up with being preyed upon, but a President should speak 
straight even if what he advocates isn’t popular.  If he sticks to his 
guns, the results will prove the wisdom of his policy.193 
Despite his campaign promises to be tough on crime by being 
tough on drugs, one of President Clinton’s first acts was to reduce 
by eighty-three percent the staff in the Office of National Drug 
Control and Policy.194  Additionally, President Clinton failed to 
appoint a new ONDCP Director until April of 1993, when he 
finally chose Lee Brown.195  However, Brown had to compete with 
the new outspoken Surgeon General, Joycelyn Elders.196  Shortly 
after President Clinton appointed her, Surgeon General Elders 
suggested the legalization of certain drugs.197  President Clinton 
responded swiftly and unambiguously reaffirmed his position 
opposing legalization by stating that “[b]asically, it’s not going to 
happen,” and by outright refusing to “even study the issue.”198  In 
1994, President Clinton removed Elders from office because of 
her unorthodox views and comments regarding sexual 
education.199  Just one year later, Brown resigned his position 
when Congress decided to cut staffing at the ONDCP by twenty 
percent.200 
 192 Michael Kramer, Clinton's Drug Policy Is a Bust, TIME, Dec. 20, 1993, at 33, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,979873-1,00.html. 
 193 Id.  Even though President Clinton vowed to make treatment, not law 
enforcement, the center of his drug policy, by the end of his administration virtually 
nothing had changed, at least in regard to funding.  Of the $17.9 billion expended on drug 
related efforts in 1999, only $5.5 billion was spent on prevention and treatment efforts, 
while $12.4 billion was spent on law enforcement, interdiction, and efforts to reduce 
sources of drug supply. Margarita Mercado Echegaray, Drug Prohibition In America: 
Federal Drug Policy and Its Consequences, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1215, 1243 (2006).  See 
also Press Release, Office of the Vice President, Vice President Gore Unveils 1999 
National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 8, 1999), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/ 
press/1999pres/19990208.html.  Similarly, for the year 2000 President Clinton requested 
$5.6 billion for treatment and prevention programs and $12.1 billion for law enforcement 
and interdiction efforts. Echegaray, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. at 1243. 
 194 DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 282 
(Oxford University Press 1999). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Kramer, supra note 192. 
 198 Stephen Labaton, Surgeon General Suggests Study of Legalizing Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/us/surgeon-
general-suggests-study-of-legalizing-drugs.html?pagewanted=1. 
 199 MUSTO, supra note 194, at 283. 
 200 Id. 
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Little did President Clinton realize that he would soon 
encounter a problem very similar to the cocaine issues that had 
plagued former President Reagan—although this time, the 
problem was marijuana.  Beginning in 1992, and throughout 
President Clinton’s first term in office, the use of marijuana 
among teenagers was on the rise.201  In 1996, an election year, 
President Clinton renewed his attack on drugs and appointed 
Barry McCaffrey as director of the ONDCP.202 
Late in 1996, California passed Proposition 215, also known 
as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, which “decriminalized the 
possession of small amounts of marijuana for patients suffering 
from serious, debilitating diseases.”203  The statute provided that 
“no physician in [California] shall be punished, or denied any 
right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a 
patient for medical purposes.”204  While physicians were now free 
to discuss the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, they still 
could not prescribe the drug.  Patients instead were required to 
grow it themselves or buy it from other sources.  In direct 
response to Proposition 215, the Clinton Administration declared 
that the California proposition and the medical marijuana acts 
passed in other states would not impact enforcement of federal 
drug laws.205  The administration’s response faced heavy 
backlash from advocates of medical marijuana use, and several 
members of the medical field.206  These critics claimed that the 
response was simply an effort to assure the public that the 
 201  
According to the Monitoring the Future survey, the percentage of twelfth-
graders who said they had used the drug at least once during the last 30 days 
rose from 11.9 percent in 1992 to 21.2 percent in 1995; the percentage of 
eighth[-]graders increased from 3.7 percent to 9.1 percent over the same 
period. 
Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 J. Wells Dixon, Conant v. McCaffrey: Physicians, Marijuana, And The First 
Amendment, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 978 (1999). 
 204 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1999). 
 205 President Clinton, through drug czar Barry McCaffrey, the Department of Justice, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, warned physicians that they would be prosecuted for recommending 
marijuana to their patients, and warned patients they would be prosecuted for using the 
drug. See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 
215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164–66 (Feb. 11, 1997). 
 206 Several groups began challenging the federal government’s marijuana policy. See, 
e.g., Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (granting a preliminary 
injunction against the federal government, prohibiting the prosecution or sanctioning of 
physicians who recommended the medical use of marijuana, but recognizing that “[i]f 
[the] physicians’ conduct, which could include speech, [rose] to the level of aiding and 
abetting or conspiracy in violation of valid federal [drug laws], such conduct [would be] 
punishable under federal law”). 
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Clinton Administration was not easy on drugs.207  Overall, under 
the Clinton administration, the War on Drugs set new records in 
regard to money spent, number of arrests and incarcerations, and 
length of prison terms.208 
G.  Bush Battled Demand for Drugs 
President George W. Bush, elected in November of 2000, 
made the most aggressive statements regarding the war on drugs 
since the Reagan administration when he asserted that “[d]rug 
abuse threatens everything, everything that is best about our 
country . . . .  It breaks the bond between parent and child.  It 
turns productive citizens into addicts.  It transforms schools into 
places of violence and chaos.  It makes playgrounds into crime 
scenes.  It supports gangs at home.”209  He claimed that “[o]ver 
time, drugs rob men, women and children of their dignity and of 
their character,” he and declared that “[i]llegal drugs are the 
enemies of ambition and hope and when we fight against drugs 
we fight for the souls of our fellow Americans.”210 
After several months of searching for an appropriate drug 
czar, President Bush finally appointed John Walters in May 
2001.211  In his nomination speech, President Bush affirmed their 
shared anti-drug stance, and expressly disagreed with those who 
favored legalization.  Bush stated that “the only humane and 
compassionate response to drug use is a moral refusal to accept 
it.”212  He then went on to say that the administration would 
continue efforts to eradicate the drug supply, but revealed his 
plan to focus instead on the demand side of the drug problem.213 
The 2002, 2005, and 2006 National Drug Strategies of the 
Bush administration reiterated the belief that the fight against 
drug use must continue.214  While former President Clinton had 
created a complex and comprehensive National Drug Control 
 207 Id. 
 208 Dixon, supra note 203, at 999. 
 209 Bush: War On Drugs Aids War On Terror, CBS News, Dec. 14, 2001, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/12/14/politics/main321433.shtml. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Remarks Announcing the Nomination of John P. Walters To Be Director of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 506 (May 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45600. 
 212 Id. at 507. 
 213 Id. at 507–08. 
 214  OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY, UPDATE 4 (2005), available at http://studentoffortune.com/question/103663/ 
sociology/158745-RelativeResourceManager2.pdf [hereinafter 2005 NDCS UPDATE] 
(updating drug control strategies and progress from 2001 through 2005 while projecting 
those for 2006). 
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Strategy,215 President Bush’s strategies had just two sets of 
articulated goals: two-year goals and five-year goals.  The two-
year goals called for a ten percent decrease in illicit drug use by 
eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth-graders, and a ten percent decrease 
in illicit drug use by individuals over the age of majority.216  The 
five-year goals called for a twenty-five percent decrease in 
current illicit drug use by eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth- graders, 
and a twenty-five percent decrease in illicit drug use by 
individuals over the age of majority.217 
Additionally, the 2002, 2005, and 2006 Drug Strategies also 
attempted to balance the attack on the supply of drugs with the 
attack on the demand for drugs.  The focus of the Drug Strategies 
was to “denormalize drug use by creating a climate of public 
intolerance toward the drug-using behavior that all too often 
leads to addiction.”218  The Drug Strategies set forth three 
national priorities: (1) Stopping Use Before It Starts: Education 
and Community Action,219 (2) Healing America’s Drug Users: 
Getting Treatment Resources Where They Are Needed,220 and 
(3) Disrupting the Market: Attacking the Economic Basis of the 
Drug Trade.221  While President Bush proclaimed to balance 
prevention, treatment, and supply strategies, his drug budget 
told a different story. 
At first glance, a comparison of the 2001 Drug Control 
Budget with subsequent Drug Control Budgets shows a reduction 
in drug control spending.  However, this was just an illusion 
created by restructuring the budget through, among other things, 
exclusion of drug-related spending by the federal judiciary, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and other Justice Department 
agencies in the prosecution and incarceration of drug 
 215 See supra Part II.F. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 34. 
 219 Prevention efforts included “school- and community- based programs, student 
drug testing programs, and public service advertisements.” Id. at 15. 
 220 The expansion of treatment resources was a priority in both the 2005 and 2006 
National Drug Strategies.  These efforts included  
drug courts, where the power of the criminal justice system is combined with 
the skillful healing of treatment providers in service of the drug dependent 
individual, . . . hospital emergency rooms, where doctors are now screening 
individuals for evidence of drug dependence and referring them to treatment as 
needed, . . . nonprofit organizations that serve the needs of formerly addicted 
prisoners reentering society. 
Id.  The treatment priority focused on “[e]mpowering individuals by allowing them to 
choose among various drug-treatment programs.” Id. at 25–28. 
 221 The National Drug Control Strategies also sought to disrupt the market for illegal 
drugs by “inflict[ing] on [the drug] business what every legal business fears—escalating 
costs, diminishing profits, and unreliable suppliers.” Id. at 39. 
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offenders.222  Because much of the drug law enforcement 
resources were wiped from the Drug Control Budget, it is difficult 
to estimate how much the war on drugs actually cost, but the 
2004 and 2005 Drug Control Budgets did show that increased 
resources were allocated to enforcement and interdiction.223  
Thus, while billions of dollars were spent on drug use prevention 
and reduction, most of the drug control budget was still allocated 
to law enforcement efforts. 
In 2002, Asa Hutchinson, then the head of the DEA, stated 
that the DEA would “continue to aggressively identify and build 
cases against drug-trafficking organizations contributing to 
global terrorism” and “[i]n doing so, [would] limit the ability of 
drug traffickers to use their destructive goods as a commodity to 
fund malicious assaults on humanity and the rule of law.”224  
Furthermore, the Bush administration continued the assault on 
medical marijuana and ultimately shut down thirty to forty 
dispensaries.225  These efforts by the Bush administration were 
bolstered in 2005 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. 
Raich.226  In Raich, the Court held that, under the commerce 
power, Congress could forbid the use of marijuana even in states 
where it was approved for medical purposes.227  Overall, while 
President Bush’s strategies called for an increased focus on 
prevention and treatment, the actions of his administration 
tended to show that the focus remained squarely on law 
enforcement. 
H.  Obama Opts for Change in Drug Policy 
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama declared the war 
on drugs to be “an utter failure.” 228  However, despite President 
 222 See OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY: FY 2003 BUDGET SUMMARY, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ 
publications/pdf/budget2002.pdf (last visited June 21, 2010). 
 223 For example, the total budget for 2004 was $11.8 billion, of which $3.4 billion was 
allocated to the Department of Health and Human Services and $594.4 million to the 
Department of Education.  Meanwhile, for that same year, nearly $7.4 billion was 
expended on law enforcement, criminal justice, interdiction, and drug eradication through 
departments and agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 
Security, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  See 2005 NDCS UPDATE, supra 
note 214, at 61. 
 224 James Bovard, The Bush Administration’s “Drugs = Terrorism” Fraud (Apr. 2002), 
http://www.fff.org/comment/com0204f.asp. 
 225 Alex Johnson, DEA to End Medical Marijuana Raids, MSNBC, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29433708/. 
 226 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 227 Id. at 2. 
 228 Obama’s Drug Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs,’ 
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2009/05/15/obama-s-drug-czar-calls-for-end-to-war-on-
drugs/ (last visited May 15, 2010). 
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Obama’s campaign promises to stop federal drug raids of medical 
marijuana facilities, in early February 2009, the DEA, headed by 
Bush appointee Michele Leonhart, raided four medical marijuana 
facilities in California.229  This prompted President Obama to 
take action in implementing his plan to flip drug policy on its 
head.  Around the same time, the U.S. Senate confirmed Eric 
Holder as Attorney General.230  Then, in May 2009, the U.S. 
Senate confirmed Gil Kerlikowske as the head of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy.231 
In March 2009, Attorney General Holder stated that the 
Department of Justice would not prosecute marijuana 
dispensaries that operated legally under state law, thus 
supporting the Obama administration’s somewhat hands-off 
approach to such institutions.232  The priority of the Obama 
administration was to go after drug offenders that were violating 
both federal and state law.233  In May 2009, Director Kerlikowske 
called for an end to the “war on drugs.”234  Criticizing the phrase, 
he stated that “[r]egardless of how you try to explain to people 
it’s a ‘war on drugs’ or a ‘war on a product,’ people see a war as a 
war on them;” he also asserted that “[w]e’re not at war with 
people in this country.”235  After the Obama administration was 
vocal in its position, the raids ceased for a while.  Then, without 
regard to the administration’s position, raids resumed in August 
2009 when several clubs in Venice and Los Angeles were 
 229 Stephen Dinan & Ben Conery, Bush Holdovers at DEA Continue Pot Raids: 
Obama Vowed to End Policy, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/05/dea-led-by-bush-continues-pot-raids/. 
 230 Neil A. Lewis, Senate Votes 75-21 to Confirm Holder as Attorney General, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/us/politics/ 
03holder.html. 
 231 United States Senate—Committee on the Judiciary, Director of National Drug 
Control Policy—R. Gil Kerlikowske, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/111th 
CongressExecutiveNominations/DirectorNDCP-Kerlikowske.cfm (last visited June 21, 
2010).  When Vice President Biden announced Gil Kerlikowske’s nomination, he 
simultaneously formally downgraded the position to non-Cabinet level, a move which Vice 
President Biden had heavily criticized when made by President George H. W. Bush in 
1989.  Vice President Biden’s own wealth of knowledge regarding drug policy may be the 
reason for this move. See President to Downgrade Drug Czar Position from Cabinet 
Rank—A Move Biden Criticized in 1989, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/03/ 
president-to-do.html (Mar. 11, 2009, 10:21 PST). 
 232 Josh Meyer & Scott Glover, U.S. Won’t Prosecute Medical Pot Sales, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2009, at A8, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/19/local/me-
medpot19. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs,’ WALL ST. J., 
May 14, 2009, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124225891527617397.html. 
 235 Id. 
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attacked and agents raided a shop in Upper Lake, California.236  
On September 9, 2009, the DEA, still headed by Michele 
Leonhart, infiltrated at least twenty clubs in San Diego.237 
In October 2009, Attorney General Holder clarified the 
Obama administration’s stance on medical marijuana by 
ordering federal prosecutors to back down from pursuing cases 
involving medical marijuana patients.  He stated, “it will not be a 
priority to use federal resources to prosecute patients with 
serious illnesses or their caregivers who are complying with state 
laws on medical marijuana.”238  Rather, in fourteen states that 
allow marijuana for medical purposes, President Obama 
indicated that prosecutors needed to focus their efforts on high 
level drug traffickers, money launderers, and people using the 
medical marijuana laws as a cover.239  Then, over a year after his 
inauguration, President Obama shockingly nominated Michele 
Leonhart to be the head of the DEA.240  After her nomination, the 
DEA raids resumed.  In February 2010, DEA agents raided a 
medical marijuana operation under the control of Chris 
Bartkowicz after he granted an interview to a local Colorado 
television station.241  The DEA also hit two medical marijuana 
labs that were testing the drug for contaminants.242  At present, 
there is concern that by keeping Michele Leonhart as the head of 
the DEA, President Obama may be undermining, or possibly 
worse, backtracking on his drug war promises.243 
On February 1, 2010, the Obama administration released 
the 2011 National Drug Control Budget.244  It includes a 13.4 
percent increase in spending on prevention programs and a 3.7 
percent increase in treatment funding and it also demands an 
 236  Ryan Grim, DEA Raid Has Pot Clubs Worried, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/16/dea-raid-has-pot-clubs-wo_n_464598.html. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Carrie Johnson, U.S. Eases Stance on Medical Marijuana, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 
2009, at 1A, 6A, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 
10/19/AR2009101903638.html. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama 
Announces More Key Administration Posts (Jan. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-more-key-
administration-posts.  Michele Leonhart is known as a drug warrior; she has a strong 
distaste for marijuana that extends beyond prosecuting medical marijuana patients.  
Phillip S. Smith, Obama Nominates Drug Warrior Michele Leonhart to Head DEA—
Reformers Gird for Battle, Jan. 29, 2010, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/618/obama_ 
nominates_michele_leonhart_dea_adminstrator. 
 241 Grim, supra note 236. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244  OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET: 
FY 2011 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS 3–13 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/11budget/fy11highlight.pdf. 
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increase in funding for domestic law enforcement, interdiction, 
and international programs.245  Thus, sixty-four percent of the 
drug control budget would remain in supply reduction efforts 
while thirty-six percent of the budget would be allocated to 
demand reduction efforts.246  These numbers show virtually no 
change from the budgets produced by the Bush administration, 
despite President Obama’s promise of change.247  The Obama 
Administration certainly has plenty of time to follow through on 
campaign promises, with two years until the next election year.  
However, as of now, despite the administration’s promises to 
change drug policy, America remains in virtually the same 
position it was in during the years of George W. Bush’s 
presidency. 
III.  COMPLICATIONS WITH CONSISTENCY AND COMMITMENT 
Since President Richard Nixon declared the War on Drugs in 
1971, each administration has taken a different approach to 
combating drug addiction and implementing and enforcing drug 
policy.  The varying and often contradictory approaches have led 
to confusion, and ultimately have contributed to what many 
individuals and experts deem a failure of the War on Drugs. 
President Nixon started the War on Drugs by placing anti-
drug policies in the spotlight, creating the Drug Enforcement 
Agency and making known his views opposing legalization.  
Unfortunately, when Nixon left office his dedication to fighting 
drug use in America departed with him.248  President Ford’s 
actions in regard to the drug war were either indifferent or 
confused.  He commanded a review of drug policy and called for 
funding to be cut for the Office of Drug Abuse Policy, but then he 
created two drug-related Cabinet Positions. 249  President Ford’s 
less than impactful drug policy was all but forgotten when 
President Carter ran for and won the Presidency based on a 
platform committed to decriminalizing drugs.  However, 
President Carter faced a few setbacks and thus, although his 
viewpoints were completely opposed by his successor, President 
Reagan, the change in administration was not quite as drastic as 
it could have been.250 
President Reagan’s administration resumed President 
Nixon’s crusade against drug use.  He had a zero tolerance policy 
 245 Id. at 3–13. 
 246 Id. at 13. 
 247 See supra part II.G. 
 248 See supra Part II.A. 
 249 See supra Part II.B. 
 250 See supra Part II.C. 
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that even then First Lady Nancy Reagan promoted with her 
ever-popular “Just Say No” campaign.251  President George H. W. 
Bush followed in President Reagan’s footsteps by continuing the 
focus on enforcement and by establishing the position of drug 
czar to oversee all drug agencies.252  When President Clinton took 
office, he sought to transition the drug policy focus from 
enforcement to treatment, but, with the rise of the medical 
marijuana issues, enforcement remained in the forefront of drug 
policy.253  President George W. Bush brought back the aggression 
of the Reagan administration, with the slightly different goal of 
targeting demand as well as supply through promotion of 
prevention and the continuance of interdiction.254  President 
Obama has claimed to be taking a different approach, eradicating 
the use of the phrase the “war on drugs” and deferring to the 
states when it comes to medical marijuana laws.255  However, 
over one year into the Obama administration, it still remains 
unclear whether or not his call for change will actually 
materialize. 
Clearly, there are differences among all of these admin-
istrations, but even more concerning than such inconsistencies 
between administrations are the inconsistencies within some 
administrations.  These discrepancies started with the Ford 
administration when Congress established the Office of Drug 
Abuse Policy and President Ford promptly asked for its funding 
to be revoked and instead created two Cabinet positions in place 
of the agency.256  Next, the Carter administration faced even 
more internal contradictions than the Ford administration.  
President Carter started out with a drug policy dedicated to 
decriminalization, but backed off his efforts of reform as a result 
of a scandal regarding the person he had appointed to deal with 
drug policy.257  President Carter appointed a replacement with 
diametrically different views about decriminalization and 
ultimately supported the DEA in its creation of anti-drug model 
laws.258 
President Clinton wanted to see major reforms in drug 
policy, yet, at the same time, he wanted to cut the staff of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy by eighty-three percent.  
While President Clinton wanted to shift the focus from law 
 251 See supra Part II.D. 
 252 See supra Part II.E. 
 253 See supra Part II.F. 
 254 See supra Part II.G. 
 255 See supra Part II.H. 
 256 See supra Part II.B. 
 257 See supra Part II.C. 
 258 See id. 
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enforcement to treatment, the War on Drugs during his 
administration saw the record levels of arrests, incarcerations, 
and prison terms, and the Clinton administration spent more 
money on the drug war than any previous administration.259  The 
second President Bush’s inconsistencies came in the form of 
budgeting.  While President George W. Bush supported a drug 
policy that attacked demand for drugs more heavily than the 
drug supply, his budget did not reflect his mission.260  However, 
just over one year into its term, the Obama administration has 
some of the most obvious inconsistencies.  While President 
Obama touts an administration committed to changing drug 
policy through targeting top level drug offenders and letting 
states deal with minor offenders, the actions of his 
administrative agencies do not follow such aspirations, as is 
evidenced by the DEA’s continuing medical marijuana raids.  
Additionally, President Obama has nominated Michele Leonhart 
to continue leading the DEA.261  Not only is Michele Leonhart a 
holdover from the Bush administration that President Obama 
heavily criticized, but also her drug warrior reputation and anti-
drug stance conflicts greatly with President Obama and his 
appointments for Attorney General and drug czar.262  As an 
unfortunate result, the Obama administration has said one thing 
while doing another.  Luckily for President Obama—and the 
American public—he still has a few more years in office to rectify 
these inconsistencies. 
The myriad of different, often contradictory, viewpoints is 
not limited to those in charge of drug policy, but also extends to 
people trying to reform it. 
IV.  CHAMPIONING FOR CHANGE 
There has been much criticism of the War on Drugs, and 
many solutions have been suggested.  There are few—if any—
who believe that the current drug policies are working perfectly, 
and so the debate is not whether to reform, but rather how and to 
what degree.  Some think current drug policies are a good start, 
but they also think that these policies need tweaking and 
continual maintenance.  Others argue that there needs to be an 
intense evaluation and a major overhaul.  Still others demand a 
diametric shift in position, at least in regard to certain drugs.  At 
the 2010 Chapman Law Review Symposium, “Drug War 
Madness: Policies, Borders & Corruption,” the first panel, 
 259 See supra Part II.F. 
 260 See supra Part II.G. 
 261 See supra Part II.H. 
 262 See id. 
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entitled Current U.S. Drug Policies & Alternative Paradigms, 
addressed the reform issue.  Panelists, including former head of 
the DEA Asa Hutchinson, Thomas Jefferson School of Law 
Professor Alex Kreit, and retired Orange County Superior Court 
Judge Jim Gray, discussed their varying views on drug reform. 
Asa Hutchinson favored broad reform that built upon 
current drug policies.263  He stressed that it was a common 
misconception that America was not making sufficient progress 
in the drug war because such a view was simply not supported by 
the statistics.264  Mr. Hutchinson went on to describe how 
between 1979 and 2007 there was a fifty percent reduction of 
illegal drug use, with a seventy-five percent reduction in cocaine 
use, and between 2003 and 2007 marijuana use decreased each 
year.265  Mr. Hutchinson advocated for drug treatment courts, 
just as he did when he was head of the DEA, stating that drug 
treatment courts allow addicts to have a chance for “treatment 
with accountability.”266  However, Mr. Hutchinson further 
contended that treatment courts do not work without an 
enforcer, and he stated that from his own personal experience, 
drug offenders who enter and complete rehabilitation programs 
often thank their arresting officers first.267  Mr. Hutchinson 
specifically criticized the idea of decriminalizing and/or legalizing 
drugs.268  He cited the decriminalization experiment in Alaska, 
where the state decriminalized marijuana, resulting in 
exponential increase in use and a dissatisfied public; ultimately 
Alaska recriminalized marijuana.269  Mr. Hutchinson stated two 
other reasons for not decriminalizing drugs: first, America would 
have to legalize all drugs in order to impact drug cartels, and 
even then cartels would still exist, and second, the possibility or 
even probability of earning revenue should not be a factor in 
deciding whether to decriminalize drugs because policy should 
focus on “think[ing] about the next generation, and not just in 
terms of money.”270 
Alex Kreit took a different stance, calling for a major 
transformation in drug policy. 271  Professor Kreit stated that the 
 263 Asa Hutchinson, Former Dir. of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Address at 
the Chapman Law Review Annual Symposium (Jan. 29, 2010). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Alex Kreit, Assistant Professor of Law and Dir. of the Ctr. for Law and Social 
Justice, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Address at the Chapman Law Review Annual 
Symposium (Jan. 29, 2010). 
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drug policy was failing because America was incarcerating more 
drug offenders than any other country and the American public 
was still using drugs at a higher rate than other countries.272  He 
stated that the answer was not in federal decriminalization or 
legalization, since the federal government could not accomplish 
this by simply removing all regulation.273  Professor Kreit 
acknowledged the need for spending reform and federal 
sentencing reform, but primarily advocated for structural 
reform.274  He argued that the federal government needed to 
allow states and localities to innovate in regard to drug policy, 
but that they also needed to regulate such innovation.275  Overall, 
Professor Kreit called for a reform in the interactions between 
the states and the federal government in regard to drug policy. 
Judge Jim Gray took the most aggressive stance on 
reforming drug policy by calling for legalization—at least for 
marijuana.276  Judge Gray asserted that “drugs are here to stay,” 
and claimed that every civilization in history had some sort of 
mind altering drugs.277  He argued that we need to realize drugs 
are a permanent fixture in American culture and we need to 
work on reducing use instead of prohibiting it.278  Judge Gray 
cited to the fact that that while six groups of people—drug lords, 
juvenile gangs, government officials fighting drug lords and 
juvenile gangs, politicians, private sector security providers, and 
terrorist groups—are winning in the war on drugs, everyone else, 
especially the children, are losing.279  Judge Gray specifically 
asserted that drugs needed to be scheduled by physicians and the 
Surgeon General, rather than by law enforcement officers and 
the head of the DEA.280  Ultimately, Judge Gray argued some 
drugs needed to be rescheduled, legalized, regulated, taxed, and 
controlled, as opposed to just prohibited. 
With all of the inconsistencies among administrations, 
inconsistencies within administrations, and varying methods and 
degrees of suggested reform, it is amazing that American drug 
policy is not far less effective or even more confused.  What 
America needs most in regard to drug policy is consistency with 
no more dynamic changes between administrations, and 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Hon. Jim Gray, Judge, Orange County Superior Court, Address at the Chapman 
Law Review Annual Symposium (Jan. 29, 2010). 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
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certainly no more dramatic policy differences within 
administrations. 
V.  A CALL FOR CONSISTENCY 
Despite the best of intentions and great efforts, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy is simply not what America needs 
to create and maintain drug policy.  Instead, the United States 
should establish a Drug Policy Board that is solely responsible 
for U.S. drug policy.  This Drug Policy Board should not be 
restricted by the limitations currently placed on the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, whose Director, by law,281 must 
oppose any attempts at drug legalization.  Such limitations are 
just too restrictive to the development of drug policy.282  The 
Drug Policy Board should not be given an agenda, but rather the 
Board itself should develop an agenda that best serves the 
American public. 
The Drug Policy Board should have at least some sort of 
political independence, and would be best modeled after the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.283  The Drug Policy Board 
 281 Title VII—Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105–277, 21 Stat. 1701 (1998) provides: 
The Director . . . shall ensure that no Federal funds appropriated to the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy shall be expended for any study or contract 
relating to the legalization (for a medical use or any other use) of a substance 
listed in schedule I of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act 
(21 U.S.C. 812) and take such actions as necessary to oppose any attempt to 
legalize the use of a substance (in any form) that . . . is listed in schedule I of 
section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812); and . . . has not 
been approved for use for medical purposes by the Food and Drug 
Administration. 
 282  For example, if the government finds that marijuana has a “currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States” or “accepted safety for use of the drug 
under medical supervision,” then the drug must be removed from its Schedule I 
classification and it would be legalized for medical use.  However, as established by law, 
the drug czar must oppose legalization, and may in fact be required to downplay or even 
conceal any studies regarding to medical uses of marijuana or other Schedule I drugs.  
This leads to a drug policy that will always be rooted in prohibition without any 
consideration for changing circumstances. See Peter Guither, The Drug Czar Is Required 
By Law To Lie, http://www.drugwarrant.com/articles/drug-czar-required/. 
 283 The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is comprised of seven members who are 
appointed by the President of the United States to fourteen-year staggered terms such 
that one term expires on January 31 of every even numbered year; thus, if all governors 
serve their full fourteen-year terms, each President will only have the opportunity to 
appoint two governors during his four-year term, or four governors during his eight-year 
term.  Once appointed, the governors may not be removed for their policy views.  The 
lengthy, staggered terms and the practically irrevocable appointments are intended to 
insulate the Board of Governors from political pressures.  Additionally, the President is to 
choose both a Chairman and a Vice Chair from the sitting governors; these individuals 
will serve a four-year term that is renewable until their terms as governors (fourteen 
years) expire.  The Chairman fills the role of both spokesperson for and representative of 
the Board of Governors; the Chairman also manages the staff and presides over Board 
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should have nine voting members and three non-voting members.  
Each of the voting members shall be appointed by the President, 
confirmed by the Senate, and serve fourteen-year terms with no 
two voting members being from the same state.  The three non-
voting members should consist of the Attorney General, the 
Surgeon General, and the Secretary of Education; and each of 
these members will remain on the Drug Policy Board during 
their appointment to their respective positions.  The President 
will appoint the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Drug Policy 
Board from the currently seated voting members.  The Chairman 
and the Vice Chairman shall serve four-year terms renewable 
until their terms as board members (fourteen years) expire, or 
until they resign the position. 
The Drug Policy Board will have three distinct divisions: 
(1) education, (2) treatment, and (3) enforcement.  The education 
division of the board will focus on drug use prevention in the 
form of education in schools and communities; this division will 
always include the Secretary of Education.  The education 
division will devise after school and community programs as well 
as advertising campaigns to educate the public about drugs and 
drug use.  The treatment division will focus on the classification 
of drugs within the current schedule as well as how best to treat 
addicts, whether or not they have been convicted of a drug 
offense; this division will always include the Surgeon General.  
The treatment division will research possible medical benefits of 
currently scheduled drugs as well as new drugs.  The 
enforcement division will work on strategies to attack both drug 
demand and drug supply; this division will always include the 
Attorney General.  The enforcement division will oversee the 
Drug Enforcement Agency.  The remaining nine voting members 
will be divided into the divisions based on their individual 
backgrounds; when the President appoints new members to the 
board, he or she should consider what division void needs to be 
filled in making the appointment.  Additionally, once a member 
is appointed, just like governors of the Federal Reserve Board, 
that member may not be removed for policy views. 
While the staggered and lengthy terms and irrevocable 
appointments will help to insulate the Drug Policy Board, the 
board cannot be as independent as the Federal Reserve Board.  
Instead, the Drug Policy Board must function as part of the 
government as a whole, under the watchful eyes of Congress.  
meetings. See The Federal Reserve Frequently Asked Questions the Board of Governors, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqbog.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
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However, all drug policy must be initiated by the Drug Policy 
Board.284 
The Drug Policy Board is designed to withstand presidential 
changes and public preference transformations.  The Board will 
incorporate all of the ideas that have been tossed around by past 
administrations as well as those demanding reform.  Overall, by 
establishing a Drug Policy Board as set forth above, the 
government will introduce an element of consistency in drug 
policy that has been lacking since the War on Drugs was declared 
in 1971. 
CONCLUSION 
Conflicting views on how to deal with drug abuse in the 
United States have left the war on drugs without any fight, and 
demands for reform are as divergent as past presidential policies.  
Thus, among the continuously changing leadership of the United 
States, there must be some consistency infused in drug policy.  
The establishment of a Drug Policy Board modeled after the 
Federal Reserve Board of Directors will bring the consistency in 
drug policy that the United States needs, and frankly cannot 
progress without. 
 284 Under this proposal, members of Congress, the President, State Officials, 
Lobbyists, and even individuals may submit proposals to the Drug Policy Board, but any 
legislation related to drug policy should be initially reviewed by the Drug Policy Board 
before it is submitted to Congress. 
